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Abstract
We shall show how to treat shared belief revision and reference management in the process of
dialogues by distinguishing three types of discourse referents: (standard) discourse referents, shared
discourse referents, and the shared belief referent, using an extended version of Discourse Representa-
tion Theory, called Hyper-DRS, which can represent shared beliefs semantically in a notation based
on hyper-sets (sets in non-well-founded set theory).
1 Introduction
Belief sharing in dialogue necessarily involves circular structures, since shared beliefs have circular struc-
tures. [1]'s theory of non-well-founded sets or hyper-sets makes it possible to encode such circular struc-
tures in first-order fixed point equations, whose solution is guaranteed by his solution lemma. By adopting
[1]'s theory, we extend the expressibility of Discourse Representation Structures, called Hyper-DRS(firstly
proposed in [14, 13]), of [9, 8, 10, 2]'s Discourse Representation Theory, henceforth DRT. (See also [12] for
another version of self-referential DRS and its semantics). This extension takes the form of introducing
three new types of discourse referents, which we will show reflect our intuitions about dialogue processes.
In this paper, we shall show how to treat shared belief revision and reference management in the process
of dialogues by distinguishing three types of discourse referents: (standard) discourse referents, shared
discourse referents, and the shared belief referent. Shared discourse referents play a role in preserving
the topic of dialogues, and shared belief referents are used to convert circular propositions into first-order
equational systems, and we can update and revise a circular proposition by hanging propositions on and
taking propositions from shared discourse referents appearing in it. Thus, the three types of discourse
referents are basic devices for the management of shared beliefs. In the context of shared belief revision,
we can also characterize the three types of discourse referents in terms of the notion of accessibility and life
span. The shared belief referent and standard discourse referents can not be accessed by both conversants.
The conversants can access shared discourse referents, and each conversant can access standard discourse
referents which are introduced by herself. Shared discourse referents and the shared belief referents can
not be deleted and forgotten when shared beliefs are revised or deleted, i.e., the life span of shared belief
referents is the longest in revision processes of discourse representation structures, and the life span of
shared discourse referents is longer than that of standard discourse referents in their revision processes.
Furthermore, we can explain the connection between shared belief revision, reference management, and
dialogue process, and give a mothod of evaluation of dialogue in terms of successfulness in information
sharing.
As a result, our extended version of DRT with Hyper-DRS's can treat shared beliefs as first-order
equational systems, which, being a finite representation of inherently infinite structures, allow us to
simulate, and evaluate processes of shared belief revision and reference management in dialogue.
In section 2 we consider a probeim of the type of disourse referents connected to dialogue evaluation.
In section 3 we propose Hyper-DRS and their construction procedure from dialogue by distinguishing
shared belief referernts from the other types of discourse referents. In section 4 we distinguish and
characterize shared discourse referents. In section 5 we propose a procedure for shared belief revion
based on Hyper-DRS and the distinction of the three types of discourse referents in dialogue.
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2 A Problem of the Type of Discourse Referents concering Di-
alogue Evaluation
Many scholars ([5],[7]) show that human understanding of definite reference depends on shared belief.
However, according to [14], there are some levels of shared belief exploited for definite reference in human
dialogues. For example, consider the following exchange where John and Mary are talking about a scene
in a park, and they know Bill and Bob.
(1) John: Oh, Bill is running.
Mary: No, he is Bob/Bob is dancing.
John: No, Bob has gone to Hongkong.
Mary: Is that so?
And, suppose that it was David who John saw running, who looked like Bill, and it was Martin who Mary
saw running, who looked like Bob. That is, they were not seeing the same man, but the two different men,
David and Martin. In this situation, John and Mary were wrong by any normal criterion of correctness,
but the dialogue was not a failure. The exchanges between John and Mary were successful and rational.
As the result, after the dialogue, John and Mary shared the information that it was Bill who they had
been seeing. How can we treat such a discourse situation? Moreover, in dialogue (1) Mary changed her
belief about her reference, but she didn't abandon her intended referent, i.e., Martin. She didn't become
aware of the disagreement between her intended referent and John's intended referent. What did Mary
change in her belief?
This problem makes us aware of the existence of a hidden referent in referring in cooperative dialogues:
the referent which conversants believe that they are talking about. That is, in this case, we can distinguish
three types of referents: referents which they believe that they are talking about and believe to be identical,
those which each conversant is perceiving, and (actual) individuals. In (1), the referents which they
perceive and intend to refer to are Bill and Bob, the actual individuals are David and Martin, and there
is a man they are talking about, who does not exist in the real world. This last referent makes the
dialogue successful in spite of the disparity involved in the real situation. We call this kind of referents
shared discourse referents.
Shared discourse referents can be used even when they bear no value.
(2) John: Who is running over there?
Mary: It's Bill.
In this example, Mary can refer to the referent introduced by John and the dialogue is successful, even
when she does not actually share the referent John intends to refer to. In other words, a referent of this
kind behaves like a discourse referent in that it is not intended to refer to any particular object ([11]).
And, shared discourse referents are preserved all through a dialogue, and if they are not preserved,
then the dialogue fails.
(3) John: Oh, Bill is running.
Mary: Who?/* Who is it?
John: Bill.
Mary: Yeah.
This use of 'Who?' is almost equivalent to `Pardon?'. In this case, we can't use an anaphora. That is, the
first part of dialogue (3) failed, and the cause of the failure is the conversants' failure to share discourse
referents. For use of an anaphora is impossible.
In (1), at first John and Mary disagreed as to their shared referent but eventually they came to an
greement. They changed their shared belief through the conversation. However, they did not change the
shared discourse referent: that same thing they were talking about. Shared discourse referents are not
changed throughout a dialogue. By contrast, other information may be revised. Therefore, we propose
the following principles of dialogue based on this observation.
• Shared discourse referents make dialogues successful, and are not changed throughout a dialogue.
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• A dialogue fails and repair question like 'Pardon?' is used in order to establish shared discourse
referents.
• The rest of the shared information may be revised through a dialogue.
Thus, we should include shared discourse referents in our formalization of shared information revision in
order to treat dialogues properly. In the next section, we will formalize shared discourse referents and
revision of shared belief.
3 Discourse Referents as Shared Belief Denoting Devices
In this section, we propose a treatment of shared belief by introducing a discourse referent as shared
belief denoting device, which is similar to DRT's treatment of anaphora and donkey sentences ([9]), and
by translating shared belief into an equational system of propositions, as proposed by [4] and [3]. In
Discourse Representation Theory, We can augment information about indefinite objects by introducing
discourse referents, which play the role of a peg on which we hang new information. Similarly, we can
revise shared belief through Hyper-DRS by regarding shared belief as a kind of discourse referents.
[3, 4, 6] formalize shared belief and shared belief propositions as solutions of equational systems of
propositions. Following them, we can formalize John and Mary's shared belief or shared information
about a proposition 'Bill is running' as follows:
(4) Shared(John, Mary, Bill is_running) <=>
3q[q = (believe(John, Bill is_running A q) A believe(Mary, Bill is_running A q))].
Suppose that John and Mary revised their shared belief by a conversation as in (5),
(5) 1. John: Oh, Bill is running.
2. Mary: Yeah.
the shared belief will be what is by (4). How can we formulate this updating process of shared beliefs?
We propose to treat shared belief as a kind of discourse referents. Namely, a shared belief is translated
into a discourse referent satisfying an equational system of propositions containing the new discourse
referent, as in (6).
(6) q = believe(John, q) A believe(Mary, q)A
believe(John, Bill is_running) A believe(Mary, Bill is_running)
Revising a shared belief amounts to revising this equational system of propositions. Thus we have only
to add to this system a new piece of shared information linearly, as in (6). where q is a newly introduced
discourse referent. More formally, we propose Hyper-DRS which can represent such circular propositions
as follows.
Definition 1 A Hyper-DRS K(p) is a structure (p,dom(p),cond(p)), where p is a discourse referent
denoting K(p) itself, dom(p) is a sequence of discourse referents occurring in cond(p), and cond(p) is a
sequence of predicates or Hyper-DRS's. q
A Hyper-DRS K(p) of a dialogue between A and B from A's viewpoint is constructed by the following
procedure.
Procedure 1
(i) Initially dom(p) = {A, B, u}, cond(p) = {Self(A), Other(B), N ow(u), believe(A, p), believe(B , p)}.
(ii) If X says co, then cond(p) := cond(p) U {believe(X, q), K(q)}, dom(p) := dom(p) U {q}, where
q is a new discourse referent (See [10] for the detail of the DRS onstruction procedures for English
fragments), and K(q) is the Hyper-DRS of co.
(iii) If X says 'yeah', then cond(p) := cond(p) U {q = q'}, dom(p) := dom(p) U {q}, where q is a
new discourse referent, and q' is the discourse referent introduced last.
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This method is similar to DRT's treatment of anaphora and donkey sentences ([9]). We can augment
information about indefinite objects by introducing discourse referents, which play the role of a peg on
which we hang new information. Therefore, we can revise shared beliefs through the Hyper-DRS by
taking shared beliefs as a kind of discourse referents. We call this type of discourse referents shared belief
referents.
Thus, we have introduced shared belief referents syntactically. Can we define the semantics for them?
According to [4] and [3], in hyper-universe introduced by [1], each equational system of propositions has
a unique solution by the Solution Lemma. When we define a class of propositions co-inductively, we can
define a hyper-class of propositions containing circular propositions. We can give the semantics of shared
belief referents, using the technique of hyper-sets, as follows.
Definition 2 Given a function V from conditions to proposition types, an assignment f verifies a Hyper-
DRS K(p i ) in a model M, written f IHmK(p i ) if for some g D f , there is a unique solution of the
equation g(pi ) = (A, Vg [cond(pi )]) in M(0), where M is a seuqence of hyper-set of proposition types.
(See Appendix for more detail) 0
In what follows, we will continue task of differentiating the three types of discourse referents: (standard)
discourse referents, shared discourse referents, and shared belief referents, and we can show how to update
shared beliefs by a dialogue in terms of Discourse Representation Theory. And, we shall give a solution
to the proposed problems in section 2.
4 Shared Discourse Referents
The three types of discourse referents introduced in the previous section shares the property that they
play a role in assuring the existence of the denoted object just like eigen variables. However, we can
further differentiate the three types of discourse referents. So far we have introduced shared discourse
referents and shared belief referents. In this section, we shall argue on the distinction between standard
discourse referents and shared discourse referents in terms of accessibility and life span.
In DRT accessibility between discourse referents is defined in terms of the structure of DRS. This
concept reflects the use of anaphora in linguistics. We use the term 'accessible' also for the accessibility
of anaphora between utterances by conversants. For example, the following dialogue is anomalous.
(7) John: A man is running.
Mary: * He is the one we met yesterday.
In DRT 'a man' introduces a new discourse referent into the DRS of (7), but (7) shows that standard dis-
course referents introduced by one of the conversants are not accessible from the other of the conversants,
since Mary cannot use 'he' in order to refer to 'a man'.
The following is preferable to (7).
(8) John: A man is running.
Mary: Oh, I know what you are talking about. He is the one we met yesterday.
(8) shows that when an unshared discourse referent is shared by an utterance, such as 'I know what you
are talking about', then the other conversant can access discourse referent.
Therefore, (7) and (8) show that conversants distinguish between shared and unshared discourse
referents by their accessibility. This accessibility can be encoded by the structure of a Hyper-DRS. Shared
discourse referents are registered in the top domain, but unshared discourse referents are in an embedded
domain, as follows. Shared discourse referents are bound by the meta-condition 'talking ..about(C , x)'
which represents that the discourse referent x is shared in the dialogue by the group of conversants C.
q:
A B u p1
 x p2
Self(A); Other(B); Now(u)
believe(A, q); believe(B, q)
believe(A, p1 ); talking_about({A, B} , x)
y r e
P1 y = x; Bill(y); uOr
r C e; [e : y be_runningi 
believe(B, p2)
P2 = P1
And, sharing of discourse referents can be carried out by the following procedures on the Hyper-DRS.
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Procedure 2 Given a Hyper-DRS K(p) of a dialogue between A and B from A's viewpoint,
(i) If X says co, then cond(p) := cond(p) U {believe(X, q), K(q)}, dom(p) := dom(p) U {q}, where
q is a new discourse referent, and K(q) is the Hyper-DRS of cp.
(ii) If co contains a proper name 77, then cond(q) := {(p(77 /y), 70), y = x},dom(q) := {y}, dom(p) :=
dom(p) U {x}, and cond(p) := cond(p) U Italking_about({A,B},x)}, where y and x are new
discourse referents, if there is no x accessible to y in dom(p), or is a new proper name introduced
in the dialogue. Otherwise, cond(q) := {v)(9/y), q(y), y = x}, dom(q) := {y}, where y is a new
discourse referent and x is an accessible discourse referent from y and belongs to dom(p), i is
already introduced in the dialogue, and 'talking _about({A, B}, x) ' is in cond(p),
(iii) If cc contains a pronoun n, then cond(q) := {c(77/y), y = x}, dom(q) := {y}, dom(p) :=
dom(p) U {x}, and cond(p) := cond(p) U {talking about({A,B} , x)} , where y and x are new
discourse referents, if there is no x accessible to y in dom(p). Otherwise, cond(q) := {yo(77/y), y =
x}, dom(q) := {y}, where y is a new discourse referent and x is an accessible discourse referent
from y and belongs to dom(p) and 'talking _about({A, B}, x)' is in cond(p),
(iv) If cp contains an indefinite noun phrase `a(n) 77', then cond(q) := Mn/y), q(y)}, dom(q) := {y},
where y is a new discourse referent.
(v) If X says 'I know what you are talking about', then dom(p) := dom(p) U {z}, and cond(q) :=
dom(q) U {x = z}, where z is a new discourse referent and x is the last discourse referent in dom(q).
0
We can encode this distinction by accessibility of anaphora between conversants into the structure of
Hyper-DRS's. In other words, we can define two types of discourse referents in Discourse Representation
Theory.
The two types can be distinguished in terms of the life span of discourse referents. Suppose that John
and Mary disagreed on the referential identity of Bill and Bob.
(9) John: Oh, Bill is running.
Mary: No, he is Bob.
This disagreement is represented by the following Hyper-DRS.
q:
A B u P1i X 1 P2, P3, X2
Self(A); Other(B); Now(u)
believe(A, q); believe(B, q)
believe(A, P1); talking_about({A,B},x1) 
Yi ri el 
Pi : Yi = x i ; Biii(Yi)
uOri. ; r i
 C ei ; [ei :yi be_running]
believe(B, p2)
P1
P2 P1= P1
wrong(pi)
P2 because P3
believe(B, p3 ); talking_about({A, B}, X2 )
Y2 Y3
P3 Y2 = X1 ; Y2 = Y3
Bob(Y3); Y3 = X2
This Hyper-DRS represents each conversant as believing she and the other conversant are talking about
the same person but their identifications of the person do not coincide with each other. The condition
132 because p3 ' denotes the ground of the refutation. That is, the utterance 'No, p.' is interpreted as
meaning 'that is wrong because p.' In dialogue interpretation, we should accomodate this type of relation
denoting cohesion.
This Hyper-DRS is constructed by the following procedures.
Procedure 3 Given a Hyper-DRS K(p) of a dialogue between A and B from A's viewpoint, if X
says 'no, P', then cond(p) := cond(p) U {believe(X, pi ), K(pi ), pi because pi , believe(X, pi ), K(p,)},
209
A B u pi, xi, P2, P3, x2 P4 P5 x3 P6
Self (A); Other(B); Now(u)
believe(A, q); believe(B, q)
believe(A, Pi ); talking_about({A, B}, x i )
r1 e1
Pi	 = x 1 ; Bill(Yi)
uOri ; r1 C ei ; e : (yi be_running)
believe(B, P2)
P1
P2 P'= Pi
wrong(p1)
P2 because P3
believe(B, p3 ); talking_about({A,B), x2)
Y2 Y3
P3 Y2 = X1 ; Y2 = Y3
B0473); y3 = X2
believe(A, p4)
pil
P" = Ps; wrong(p")
P4 because P5
believe(A, p5 ); talking_about({A, B}, X3 )  
Y4 e2 r2 Y5
P5 
y4 = X2; Bob(Y4)
u0r2 ; r2 C e2
e2 : (y4 have_gone_to y5)
y5 = x3 ; Hongkong(y5)
believe(B, P6 )
P6 = P4
P4
dom(p) := dom(p) U {p i , pi }, where pi , p i are new discourse referents, and K(p i ) is the Hyper-DRS of
`no', and K(pi ) is the Hyper-DRS of cond(pi ) := {wrong(pk ), pk = ph }, dom(pi ) := {pk }, where
Pk is a new discourse referent, and p h is the last proposition discourse referent in dom(p) introduced by
the other. q
5 Shared Belief Revision in Dialogues
Furthermore, such a disagreement may be solved in dialogue as follows.
(10) John: Oh, Bill is running.
Mary: No, he is Bob.
John: No, Bob has gone to Hongkong.
Mary: Oh, is that so?
To treat this change from disagreement to agreement, the conversant must revise her belief or at least the
shared beliefs. In (10), Mary's utterance 'is that so?' revises their shared beliefs which were at variance
and resolves their disagreement. The following procedure can construct the Hyper-DRS representing the
agreed states.
Procedure 4 Given a Hyper-DRS K(p) of a dialogue between A and B from A's viewpoint, if X says
`Is that so?' then cond(p) := cond(p) U {believe(X, q), pi = ph }, dom(p) := dom(p)U {q, p i }, where q,
p i are new discourse referents, and ph
 is the last proposition discourse referent in dom(p) introduced by
the other. q
The following Hyper-DRS K(p) is constructed from (10) by procedure 4.
q:
We must explain how to delete propositions to be abandoned. In (10), Mary revised her belief or
shared belief in response to John's previous explanation 'Bob has gone to Hongkong.' This justifies the
assertion 'no' against 'he is Bob.' In other words, John's 'no' marks the assertion 'he is Bob' as deletable,
and when the ground 'Bob has gone to Hongkong' of John's 'no' has been shared, the marked assertion
`he is Bob' must be deleted. Furthermore, we must delete Mary's attitude 'no' against 'Bill is running,'
since Mary's 'no' grounds on 'he is Bob,' and this ground is refuted by John's 'no' and its ground 'Bob has
gone...' It is to be noted that deletable conditions are not conditions about the content, but conversants'
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A B u P1, X1 , P2, P3, X2 P4, P5, X3 P6
Self(A); Other(B); Now(u)
believe(A, q); believe(B, q)
believe(A, p 1 ); talking_about({A,B},x1)
Yi r1 el
Yl = x1; Bill(Yi)
uOr i ; r 1 C el ; el : (yi be_running) 
P'
P 1 = Pi
wrong(pi)
P2 because P3
ta/king_about({A,B},x2)
Y2 Y3
P3 Y2 = ; Y2 = Y3
Bob(Y3); Y3 = X2
believe(A,P4)
Pit
P" = p3 ; wrong(p")
P4 because Ps
believe(A, p5 ); talking_about({A, B}, x3)
Y4 e2 r2 Y5
Y4 = X2; Bob(y4)
uOr2 ; r2
 E e2
e2 : (y4 have_gone_to y5)
y5 = x3 ; Hongkong(y5)
believe(B, P6)
P6 = P4
P1
P2
P4
P5
propositional attitudes. The revised parts are only conversants' attitudes. This procedure can be more
formally defined as follows.
Procedure 5 Given a Hyper-DRS K(p) of a dialogue between A and B from A's viewpoint, if all of the
conversants share q and the condition 'p i because q', and p3 marks p k as deletable, i.e., wrong(p k ) E
cond(pi ), then delete believe(X, p k ) from cond(p), and add believe(X, pi ) to cond(p).0
As the result, the following Hyper-DRS of (10) is constructed.
q:
It should be noted that the shared discourse referent and the shared belief referent can not be deleted
and forgotten if the shared beliefs are revised and deleted. Therefore, the life span of shared discourse
referents and shared belief referents are the longest in revision processes of Hyper-DRS's.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown detailed structures of reference in dialogues and shared belief revision
from the viewpoint of dialogue as shared belief revision, by extending DRS to Hyper-DRS. We have
distinguished and characterized three types of discourse referents: (standard) discourse referents, shared
discourse referents, and shared belief referents, and showed how they realize dialogues as processes of
shared belief revision. Shared discourse referents play roles in preserving the topic of dialogues, and
shared belief discourse referents make circular propositions into first-order equational systems, and we
can update and revise the circular propositions. Conversants can access only shared discourse referents
except for discourse referents introduced by her own moves. Shared belief referents have the longest life
span in the dialogues. Secondly, shared discourse referents live longer than standard discourse referents.
They are deleted only if the dialogue fails and a repair question like Pardon?' is induced. Shared belief
revision is an action affecting only propositional attitudes. So shared belief referents and shared discourse
referents are not affected by any shared belief revision in dialogues.
Thus, the three types of discourse referents are foundamental devices for management of shared beliefs.
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APPENDIX
Modeling Propositions
In [4, 3]'s A ustinian model of propositions, a proposition is analyzed as a complex object: (s : r), where s is
a situation which referes to the situation described by a type r. We define two classes: types (TYPE), and
propositions (PROP) from atoms: individuals IND = {al , a2 , ...} , individual indeterminates ParIND =
{x1, •-•,xn}, time intervals and events, states, processes i, i' E TEMP, relations REL = {Believe,...},
polarities pol E POL = {1, 0}.
Definition 3 Assuming ZFC/AFA(See LW, let TYPE, PROP, SIT be the largest classes satisfying:
• a E TYPE is of one of the following forms:
– (Believe, x, p; 1), or
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—
(Talking _about, {x, y}, z; 1), or
— (True, p; 1), (True, p; 0), or
—
(Because, p, q), or
—(Self, x; 1), (Other, x; 1), (Now, i; 1), (Bill, x; 1), (Bob, x; 1) or
—(Included, i, ; 1), (Overlap, i, ; 1), (Included, i, i'; 0), (Overlap, i, i'; 0), or
—(Be_running , x; 1), (Be_dancing , x; 1), (Have_gone_to, x, y; 1), or
— (A, r), (v, r),
where p, q E PROP, x, y, z E IND U ParIND, 1' C TYPE.
• s E SIT iff s C TYPE,
• p E PROP (an atomic proposition) is a tuple (:, s, r; 1), for short (s : r), where s E SIT, r E TYPE.
We also write /5 for the dual of p, and .75- = p.	 0
Model Construction
Definition 4 A model M is a sequence of subset of TYPE, satisfying following conditions:
For any natural number n,
• no proposition and its dual are in A4 (n),
• (Self, x; 1), (Other, y; 1), (N ow, i; 1) E M(0),
• if (A, I') E A4(n) then F C M(n),
• if (Because, p, q; 1), q E M(n), then p E M(n),
• no (Because, p, q; 1) and (Because, p, 1) are in M(n),
• no (Because, p, q; 1) and (Because, 15, q; 1) are in M(n),
• if (R, x; 1), (R, y; 1) E M(n) and R E {Self, Other, Now} , then x = y,
• if (Overlap, i, j; 1) E M(n) then (Overlap, j, i; 1) E M(n) ,
• if (Included, j; 1) E M(n) then (Overlap, i, j; 1), E M(n),
• if (Overlap, j; 0) E M(n) then (Included, i, j; 0), E M(n),
• if (Overlap, i, j; 1), (Included, j, k; 1) E M(n) then (Overlap, i, k; 1) E M(n),
• if (Included, i, j; 1), (Included, j, k; 1) E M(n) then (Included, i, k; 1) E M(n),
• if (Included, i, j; 1), (Included, j, i; 1) E M(n) then i = j,
• if a temporal object k is in M(n) then (Included, k, k; 1) E M(n),
• if (True, p; 1) E A4(n) then p E A4(n),
• if (True, p; 0) E M(n) then p M(n).
• if (Believe, x,,, p; 1) E M(n) then p E A4(m). 0
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Semantics of Hyper-DRS
Definition 5 Given a Hyper-DRS K (pn) of a dialogue between A and B from A's viewpoint, an assign-
ment f from discourse referents to objects in a model M, and a function V from conditions to TYPE, f
verifies K(p fl ) in M, written f If-A4 K (pn)), iff for some g D f, there is a unique solution of the equation
g(Pn) = (A, Vg [cond(p0}) in M(0), where Vg is satisfying the following conditions:
• Vg (Sel f (x)) = (Self, g(x); 1),
• Vg (Other(x)) = (Other, g(x); 1),
• Vg (Now(u)) = (Now, g(u); 1),
• Vg (Bill(x)) = (Bill, g(x); 1),
• Vg (Bob(x)) = (Bob, g(x); 1),
• Vg (Hongkong(x)) = (Hongkong, g(x); 1),
• Vg (believe(x,p)) = (Believe, g(x), g(p); 1),
• Vg (talking_about({x, y}, z)) = (Talking _about, {g(x), g(y)}, g(z); 1)
• Vg (u0r) = (Overlap, g(u), g(r); 1),
• Vg (u c r) = (Included, g(u), g(r); 1),
• Vg ([e : x be_running]) = (Be_running , g(e), g(x); 1),
• Vg([e : x be_dancing]) = (Be_dancing, g(e), g(x); 1),
• Vg([e : x have_gone_to y]) = (Have_gone_to, g(e), g(x), g(y); 1),
• Vg (right(p)) = (True, g(p); 1),
• Vg (wrong(p)) = (True, g(p); 0),
• Vg (x = y) = (g(x) = g(y)),
• Vg (K(p)) = (g(p) = Vg[K(p)]).
K(p) is true in M, written Ibm K(p), iff for some assignment g, g Ii-mK(p). 0
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